Despite how competently these twin volumes were produced, they pale in significance to the first-hand material Commander Lunet de Lajonquière-who had not participated in the field research-had been provided to feed his prose. Both Ethnographies were just the tip of an iceberg of four thousand handwritten pages of field reports produced in situ by seventy different authors. These originals were long thought to have disappeared or to have been scattered in the turmoil of a war-torn twentieth century. Yet, it turns out that copies of nearly the entire venture had been tucked away in archive vaults, where I stumbled upon them. Together with a few connected administrative archival documents, they tell the story of a remarkable venture in the colonial ethnography of upland Tonkin from the unlikely cultural perspective of the military.
This article proposes a narration of that forgotten endeavor conducted a little over a century ago in the borderland mountains of today's northern Vietnam.  First, I consider the logic of the militarization of the northern borderlands at the end of the nineteenth century, a strategic policy that triggered the launch of two surveys in  and . I then examine the methods used in the drafting of these surveys and, building upon material from the original documents, I comment on the mindset of the officers who performed this task.
Digging up new ethnography from the past matters for a number of reasons. Most of the highland population covered by these surveys did not develop endogenous scripts, and thus, did not produce archives. Archeological research in their locale is still in its infancy and has not yet yielded operational results. To further complicate the matter, most of these societies never conferred great significance to personal or collective memory beyond a couple of generations, which makes mining their oral history much less promising than one might hope. Researchers are thus left with only sparse and fragmented material written by outside witnesses. Even then, as historian Bradley Davis recently showed, usable Vietnamese sources on the northern highlands are meager.  As a consequence, and by default as it were, early French colonial sources become priceless.  This is not to suggest that such military ethnography produced by inexperienced observers embedded in a rigid colonial institution should automatically be labeled ethnography in the modern, professional sense of the word. What might its true value be then? Let us reserve judgment until the last part of this journey.
Military Rule in Upland Tonkin
In , China, Vietnam's longtime overlord, transferred suzerainty over the imperial north by treaty to the new French colonial rulers.  For the freshly debarked governor general of Indochina [gouverneur général de l'Indochine], the top commissioner in French Indochina, controlling the vast territory along the Chinese border figured on the list of priorities. Through numerous violent military operations euphemistically titled "pacification missions" [missions de pacification], France took steady action during the rest of the s and most of the s to occupy first the Red River Delta, then its peripheral catchment and principal adjacent valleys, and finally the mountains. Opponents were repressed and submissive populations rewarded, the latter being far more numerous as local peasants were generally relieved to see a new power instilling some order in these precarious highlands plagued for decades by "bandit rule."  The French military's penetration of the uplands over the s was strongly influenced by an ideology best represented by diplomat Auguste Pavie and Colonel Théophile Pennequin.  This involved negotiations with adversaries to begin with, and more belligerent action when diplomatic means failed. In the years before the frontier was secured, parties of brigands from the north and east constantly roamed the mountain paths.  To cement its power in the region, France made alliances with some of the stronger local highland parties and worked with them to curb banditry and run the region.  It took until  to finalize the bilateral demarcation of the border with China.  Up to that point, French knowledge of Chinese borderland occupants was slim. Before , the only information that had been collected about nonKinh and non-Han uplanders had come from moderately dependable reports occasionally filed by a handful of explorers venturing across mountains.  Nonetheless, the military command had made certain operational assumptions. French historian Nguyễn Thế Anh documented that in the minds of the general staff in Hà Nội, the northern mountains sheltered three types of unwanted populations: rebels hostile to the French occupation; groups of loosely-organized looters harassing the local peasants; and massive
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groups of organized, exogenous bandits involved in large-scale looting and trafficking that were able to pose a threat to places as well-guarded as Luang Phrabang and Hà Nội.  With this picture in mind, the French decided in  to divide Tonkin into three broad zones corresponding to the various modes of organization and grouping of bands: ) the central delta zone with Annamite [Kinh] bands only (around two hundred and fifty); ) the delta's outskirts with mixed Annamite and Chinese bands; ) the Highlands zone with permanent Chinese bands or occasional raiding Chinese pirates.  As this suggests, at the end of the nineteenth century the French chiefly acknowledged Kinh Vietnamese (Annamites) and Han Chinese (Chinois) as explicit ethnicities in upland Tonkin. Peasant "natives" were known to be in these highlands but were not yet taken into account-a sketchy picture.
M I L I T A R I Z I N G T H E B O R D E R L A N D S
As spelled out in the  order signed by the Governor General of Indochina Jean de Lanessan (-), the colonial administration judged that the numerous bands of entrenched bandits had to be dislodged from the mountains.  The administration concluded that successful occupation of the high frontier could not be achieved without civil and military powers being united. Thus, the Military Territories [Territoires Militaires], were created on August , . From the little information he had to base his decisions on, Governor de Lanessan sensed that the native population was so diverse that a standard provincial centralization mirroring the lowlands was unworkable. In any case, this upland population was also so sparse compared to the delta that the meager taxes they might yield would not be enough to support a regular civilian administration. To avoid what civil and military authorities pronounced "a possible political contamination" from the highlands into the lowlands-a sign that they feared not merely "pirates," but also political opponents to the colonial project-they drew a demarcation line to separate the border region from the Red River Delta.  With the line equipped with blockhouses and permanent troops, it was hoped that this would be "strong enough to constitute a definitive obstacle to the movements of bandit bands [ . . . and] At ground level, this whole process was summed up by an officer in a  sector report:
The French administration is represented in the area by the captain commanding the post of Trùng Khánh Phủ and the sector of the same name, assisted by the officers and noncommissioned officers in charge of posts. These, however, have only a policing and monitoring duty, all administrative action being concentrated in the sector head town. The sector commander sees especially to collect taxes on behalf of the protectorate, thus preventing to a large extent any abuse by the indigenous authorities. He ensures the implementation of all the requirements of the French administrative authority in the territory, represented by the military authority. . . . Facing the French administration is the native administration, completely subjected to the former, for which it is the executing agent. This native administration is modeled on the administration in the delta imposed by the court of Huế.  Tonkin that endured long after his stay from -.  Galliéni integrated the armament of local groups in a global occupation program of the military territories with the aim of "constituting, along the border, a military zone solidly watched over sufficiently to make impossible the stay or the transit of any band."  Galliéni was mindful of the human factor in his equation. As demonstrated by Henri Eckert, Galliéni's program focused on obtaining support from the population.  Building trust, erasing the fresh terror of the conquest, and taming the ubiquitous and dreaded roaming bandits became the primary objectives of the colonial occupying force. The next step was to become strategically acquainted with the various ethnic groups inhabiting the highlands, understand their chain of command, learn about their customs, and gain influence over them. 
FR ENCH MILITAR Y ETH NOG RA PH Y IN COLONIAL U P PE R T ONKIN The Story Behind Our Two Seminal Surveys
By the late s, security issues had largely subsided and a degree of tranquility was established on the Chinese frontier. The goal of the region's day-to-day administration then turned to the fullest possible exploitation of the uplands' economic potential, or mise en valeur, as the French obliquely called the operation; hence, a need to learn more about the local peoples.  The French recognized the importance of "winning the hearts" of local populations in anticipation of achieving "the superior political control that comes from better understanding [them] ."  However, they faced a lack of documentation; if something was to be learned about highland border indigenous peoples, someone would have to design and conduct surveys.  This effort was handled in two somewhat disjointed steps, in  and .
The first thrust in this process came from the highest level. Governor General Paul Doumer (- and -), who would briefly become President of France, was an energetic and authoritarian bureaucrat who left borderline, Doumer's enterprise aimed explicitly at sizing up the northern borderlands. He wanted to take stock of its resources, assess the state of its economic development and trade, and measure its economic potential for the colonial economy-all this in a fashion characteristic of a conscientious landlord pacing a newly purchased estate and appraising its promises.
Once conceived, Doumer passed his request to his commander in chief for the Indochina Troops, Division General A.E.J. Bichot (, -), who circulated a note on March ,  ordering commanders in each of the four military territories to use all available resources to conduct the necessary research at the sector level.  The research was to cover the physiology itary territory (barring the rd). The breakdown is ten sector reports from the st military territory, nine each from the nd and rd, and seven from the th, for a total of just over three thousand manuscript pages. Clearly, this scholarly structure for a field survey was an improvement on Doumer's  model, exhibiting a more sophisticated awareness of the intricacies of societies and cultures. But it was also designed to avoid exceeding a point in sophistication that would render it unworkable by non-scholars.
Most information sought by these instructions was of a fairly immediate nature and did not require skills other than common sense. Section XIII, however, dealing with religion, jumped up several notches in difficulty and would have been hard for non-professionals to tackle. One can also note the absence of any question about history, an odd oversight. But what mattered was that this EFEO questionnaire of  was a new tool available to local, one-time ethnographers, and one to be reckoned with. Oddly, as I discovered to my surprise, Governor Beau ignored it entirely.
Beau used both civilian and military channels to convey his demand for a survey to the administrative hierarchies. The civilian channel went through the normal administrative chain, from the governor general to each of the FR ENCH MILITA RY ET HNOG R AP H Y I N C OLO NIA L U PP ER TONKIN resident superiors, then down the ladder to each provincial resident, on to local administrators.  On the military side, in a two-page note issued on June , , Governor Beau gave orders to his commander in chief, General Coronnat:
The gradual extension of administrative action to populations who until now remained outside the influence of our civilization has highlighted the government's new need for a more precise body of information concerning the aboriginal races in the Peninsula than the one it holds at the moment. In consequence, I honorably request you, dear General, to give instructions to the commanders of Military Territories to undertake this work in every Sector.  The governor and his staff were aware that critical factual informationorography, hydrography, patterns of roads and trails, location and number of partisans, and so forth-had been gathered during the - survey. The time has come to conduct a first attempt at ethnic statistics in Indochina. It should be anticipated that the mere collection of the information available today will not suffice to put together exact and complete statistics; however it will provide its first elements and will usefully condense what is known, highlighting more precisely what remains to be known.
Eager to see his initiative succeed, Beau insisted that the task should be performed with diligence and care:
I put serious interest in this survey, which will undoubtedly facilitate the progress of our authority in every part of the country. I am sure the officers in charge of administering the Military Territories will enthusiastically seize this opportunity to demonstrate the knowledge they have gained of the populations in their care.
The advancement of colonial influence was explicitly at stake. In each of the forty-seven sectors included in the military territories by , officers were specifically asked to produce one ethnic map and a monograph.  The map had to be drawn at a :, scale to match the scale of the ordinance survey maps produced by the Geographical Service of the General Staff.
It was expected to be color-coded to indicate the distribution of the different ethnic groups (see Figure ) .  As for the monographs, it was required that they cover all of the different "races" present in each sector, each officer being told to follow the same structure per race:  -Name of the group: a) the name they use for themselves; b) the name given to them by other natives. 
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As noted earlier, this structure bears no recognizable resemblance to the more elaborate guidelines proposed in EFEO's  Instruction booklet. I have found nothing in the archives to help understand why. It is almost unthinkable that Beau had not been made aware of the existence of the EFEO proposal. As the simplest explanation is frequently the most likely one, common sense suggests that Beau (and/or General Coronnat) might have wanted to keep things straightforward, possibly worrying that the EFEO questionnaire would be too intellectually demanding or unnecessarily time consuming for their already overstretched officers in the field. The governor had explicitly requested that the information be with him no later than December , -short notice of little over six months during what officers on the frontier judged to be the busiest part of the year. From the point of view of those who had to carry out the orders, this chunk of time must have appeared hardly sufficient for the multiple tasks involved: communicate the request down the chain of command, push aside many current priorities to make room for this one, allocate material and human resources, mobilize interpreters and transport, conduct the survey as such, draft up reports and maps, have them checked by superior officers and possibly sent back for amendments, and finally produce a clean version, make copies of it, and return it up the hierarchy, all of which was an extra burden for an occupation force on the frontier.
Addressing a crucial methodological issue overlooked in the  instructions, Governor Beau also added that: "One shall carefully specify the nature of the information provided: whether it is first-or second-hand; whether it is certain, probable, or doubtful." Beau made a closing request that "in the future, it would be advisable to summarize data newly collected in a global report to be sent to me at the end of each year."  But judging by the absence of archives testifying to their existence, it is possible that no subsequent reports were ever produced.
We can gather from the sector reports that the general plan was for these reports to be written, copied at sector level, and sent to the territory's headquarters to be copied and filed. The originals were to then be passed on to the general staff, approved, and handed over to Commander Lunet de Lajonquière, who was in charge of the overall summary. His final cut was submitted on September , , eight and a half months after the At EFEO's archives in Paris, there are now thirty-six sector reports for  out of roughly forty-seven sectors (Appendix ). These include nine reports from the st military territory, ten from the nd, seven from the rd, and ten from the th, amounting to  manuscript pages, though some sector reports curiously yielded a mere four or five pages. To this were added a few summary reports on specific ethnic groups or linguistics, written by higher or better-informed officers, adding about five hundred pages to the initial tally. This yielded a grand total of  pages of field based material for the  survey-considerably less than the three-thousand-plus pages for the - survey. However, the material for the second survey is entirely devoted to ethnography.
The Field Reports

T H E     -    R E P O R T S : S T R A T E G I C E S S E N T I A L S A N D E U R O C E N T R I C O V E R T O N E S
We now examine in more detail how the request from "on high" materialized in the field and how the authors' positionality played out. First we need to consider briefly how the reports were produced. Officers heading individual sectors were put in charge of the field surveys. The only local language likely to be spoken by the average field-based French officer in the upper region was a basic form of Vietnamese. Typically arriving from other colonies for their two-or three-year posting, these officers had little opportunity to develop language proficiency. They used interpreters, with literate local assistants writing field notes and transcriptions. Each officer signed the report he produced, or, if someone else had performed the task, countersigned it. The reports therefore leave little doubt as to their authorship.  For example, during the first survey, the Hoang-thu-bi (today Hoàng Su Phì, Hà Giang Province) report in the rd military territory was first signed by Lieutenant Pauvif on April , , while data was reported to have been collected by Pauvif and Captain Lapouble. Once completed, the report was countersigned by the sector commander on April , -which, just twenty-four hours after it was signed by the authors, suggests mere rubberstamping.
The reports do not mention the language(s) used during interviews and do not provide the identities or profiles of the informants; the commission did not request these details. From the - reports, we can deduce that information likely came from local leaders and elders as well as "natives" living in and around posts or coming to visit the periodic markets. There is no evidence of fieldwork in village sites; however, regular patrols outside the immediate vicinity of the posts must have enabled discussions in situ with local elders and leaders.
There is evidence in the reports from this first survey that authors understood that their surveying duties were contributing to the colonial project. We can work in confidence thanks to the establishment of land communication, the encouragement given to the natives and their cultures, the diffusion of French education, a prudent and wise administration, [and] a consistent vigilance aimed at stopping incursions by border marauders. We can pave the way to colonization and fulfill with dignity the avant-garde mission of civilization reserved for the military administration.  One can also sense that a good proportion of the authors of the - reports had only modest respect for the highlanders and their customs.
Some bought into the myth of the "lazy native."  Eurocentric infantry officers mostly belonged to the newly-arrived occupation force that had been in Indochina for only a short time. With a typically middle-to upper-class European take on economic behavior, they demonstrated a severe misunderstanding of peasant pragmatism. One example out of many: "Before this region can achieve great prosperity, we will first have to triumph over the natural apathy of its inhabitants. This population is improvident and lazy.
In their view, harvest should only provide for one year."  For this officer, the taxation of agricultural produce could solve this problem and "oblige the natives to produce beyond their immediate needs . . . an interesting task for any officer concerned with the future of the region he administers."  Other, less numerous but usually more seasoned officers took a softer stance: "[The Tai are a] strong, sober, intelligent, and honest race . . . We are not facing here the same population as in the Delta, which has been enslaved for centuries, ever ready to obey as long as one shows sufficient force."  And again: "Essentially hardworking, the races of Upper-Tonkin have nothing in common with the Chinese and Annamite races, particularly regarding the loose morals of the latter two."  In a note added at the end of the -page manuscript, the author of this last quote, Lieutenant Probst, was praised by a superior officer declaring that the lieutenant's long stay in the upland region had allowed him to produce a fine document. Probst's report appears to exemplify the higher standards achieved by the more dedicated military ethnographers during the - survey. In the opening section of his report's third chapter, entitled "Ethnologie," to which he devotes fifteen and Hu-nhi [Hà Nhì] from Yunnan four decades earlier-further suggest that the author must have had access to documents providing some historical and ethnographic background, or that he was able to communicate with someone conversant in such documents.
One would expect the agency and positionality of the authors of the - sector reports to be most obvious in the conclusions, especially the "Desiderata" segment where authors were expected to voice their opinions. Most officers, however, limited their personal contributions to administrative matters, essentially stressing the economic potential of the -The Man population should settle down and cultivate the numerous rice fields existing in the plains; -Fighting their natural apathy, the Taï should succeed in performing two harvests per year, which is not impossible; -The serious and hardworking Annamite agriculturalists should migrate here to offer a model to the indigenes and force them to produce more than they actually do; -All these races should undertake animal breeding, oxen especially, and horses; -They should be supported in their efforts, [and] we should know how to help them fight the climate, which is unhealthy even for those who have been living here for a long time; -New European colonists should set up sawmills and breeding farms in order to keep the poor natives usefully busy.  Others, such as Captain Moraine, differ: "The Taï man is not as malleable [as the Kinh]. That man is a self-styled epicurean and seems happy this way.
Why should we disturb his peace of mind?"  In the rest of his conclusion, however, Moraine reveals a biased agenda promoting the expansion of agriculture for his sector, suggesting that his initial open-mindedness towards the Taï's' low productivity might have also been a roundabout way to sideline them from future economic development.
Despite an assortment of views and commentaries, we nonetheless have here an overall case of the institutional production of knowledge reflecting foreign ideologies. This knowledge was centrally planned and structured, using a dominant power position to extract information. The result was an authoritative, yet warped, text. The hand of the colonial state is visible at every stage in the production of these reports, from the conception of the survey to the final counter-signature by the top officers, not to mention the secrecy in which the documents were kept. We know that the - sector reports were collected by the General Government of Indochina, hence their cataloguing and conservation in the GGI series. However, there is no evidence that a synthesis or combination of the data has ever been performed. There is no known publication stemming from this survey, and no reference is made to it as a centrally planned venture in subsequent publications.  Together, these clues suggest that the military nature of the survey sufficed to keep the results away from the eyes of scholars and the general public.
T H E     R E P O R T S : E T H N O G R A P H Y A T L A S T
All field authors diligently followed the structure and timetable that Governor Beau demanded for the sector-level reports. A tight calendar and military pragmatism did, however, drive several authors to save time and effort by recycling sections of the  reports in their "Généralités" sections, as exemplified by this quote:
The information given in the first part of this work are: ) A summary of the [ report]; ) A summary of a geological report by the engineer [name missing]; ) A table of altitudes collated in  by Lieutenant Delahaye; ) A summary of a few notes found in archives that have been checked.  Beau's structure for this survey exhibited a focus on cultural dimensions in many fields of ethnological knowledge. Some questions went far beyond what "achieving the superior political control that comes from the better understanding" required, showing interest above and beyond immediate administrative concerns. For instance, the first item in this questionnaire expresses an expected interest in exonyms, but also in autonyms, a refreshing sign of awareness. Item four, on language, points to a linguistic and classificatory agenda better suited to an academic survey than a military one. Clothes (item ), religious beliefs (item ), and customs relating to "all circumstances of social life" (item ) follow a similar pattern. The final cautionary note regarding "the nature of the information provided" expresses
FR ENCH MILITA RY ET HNOG R AP H Y I N C OLO NIA L U PP ER TONKIN
a level of critical reflexivity that was altogether absent from the - survey.
Most reports for  point to indigenous leaders as the main infor- Here are three more extensive quotes representative of the writing style and the range of subjects covered in the  reports:
The course of the Sang Bang Giang is the major trade route. Navigable from Ha Xat north of Cao Bang, it passes through Cao Binh and Cao Bang, two very important markets, Lao Binh, Phuc Hoa, Ta Lung, three marketplaces inside the Sector, and the Chinese markets of Thuy Can, Ha Dong, and Long Tchéon. Sampans sailing up from Long Tchéon bring Chinese goods to all these markets at low cost. 
The Man, who are great hunters and who fish too, have the equipment necessary to engage in these kinds of exercises. We see these hanging in a corner of their homes: first a primitive crossbow, then a fork to spear the fish, and finally this strange gun that the Man Méo Tam make themselves from scratch, a matchlock with elongated barrel and without a stock, which can't be shouldered and that one simply places against the cheek to aim . . . They use these guns to hunt the predators and other animals that come prowling around their homes or cause damage to their crops.  When the funeral is decided, the coffin, covered with a small house in white paper with a bamboo frame, is led to the location chosen by the sorcerer. Upon exiting the funeral house, the coffin must go over the backs of children, who bow to this effect, paying the deceased a final mark of respect. This is followed by the burial. As soon as the coffin is covered with dirt, the little paper house is burned and the banquet begins on the very grave of the deceased and continues inside the funeral house.  It is plain from such quotes that compared to the - survey, the - survey bears the mark of an academic formalization that went beyond the immediate needs of the colony's management. But it also stops short of having fully transformed into a uniquely ethnological survey, at least when the situation is considered from a non-French point of view.  In the British colonies and among Amerindians in the United States at the time, similar surveys were diligently following the precepts of the influential Notes and Queries on Anthropology handbook, which, despite having already been through two editions by the turn of the twentieth century, does not seem to have had the least influence on the French surveys in Indochina.  In the French context, where the gathering of data was still firmly separated from its intellectualization, fieldwork was still handed over to cursorily briefed non-specialists, and it was to remain so for a while more.  Altogether less palpably instrumental than the - investigation, the - survey yielded background texts expressing a lower degree of subjectivity and, by contrast, appear practically devoid of authors' personal views regarding civilizational gaps and how best to run the borderlands and their "primitive" populations. Instead, the - survey produced a vast register of comparatively objective linguistic, social, and cultural data through which the disposition of each author crops up only inadvertently, if at all.
Another noteworthy ingenuity in the second survey was the production of a two-hundred-page ethnic summary report covering the rd military territory. This had not been completed at the territory level for the - survey, nor for that matter in the second survey, save for this particular territory. This impromptu initiative had to do with the presence of Captain Auguste Bonifacy (-), a gifted autodidact linguist and ethnologist.  Commander of a sector and then a circle in the rd military territory in -, and later the territory's commander, Bonifacy produced a hefty race-by-race summary report covering the whole of the rd military
territory, signed December , .  Was this a personal initiative when human resources were scarce? More likely, it was a request coming from Commander Lunet de Lajonquière, who needed a capable subaltern to harmonize data across reports and provide a summary of the material for the final published volume.  Captain Bonifacy interestingly began his report with two pages of musings explaining his intentions and commenting on the global process of sector-level report production. Bonifacy was not alone in this. Others had also explicitly pointed to the dilemma: "Unfortunately, the lack of sufficiently trained interpreters and the relatively short time left to produce this report due to other significant work have made it that some issues remained in obscurity while others could not be given the full extent they deserved."  Bonifacy's comments encapsulate the predicaments the whole process faced.
He wrote:
It is as an attempt to fill . . . gaps that this report is followed by a monograph for each race, summarizing our personal observation. These monographs deal primarily with questions that sector commanders could only touch upon. They are written along a single model for clarity, including: name -languagewriting -social organization -property -slavery -intellectual and moral statereligion -myths -afterlife -rites of birth, marriage, death -will -law and justice.  But Bonifacy did not merely summarize the sector reports from the rd military territory as suggested by Lunet de Lajonquière in the note above, he also complemented them significantly, devoting much space in particular to matters of "religion -myths -afterlife -rites of birth, marriage, death -willlaw and justice," which he rightly assessed were largely missing from the sector reports.  With ten years of experience in Tonkin under his belt-he had landed in Indochina in  at age , already a captain with twenty-one years of experience in the military-and a few scholarly articles published in good outlets, he went on:  The work of the sector commanders shows on the part of these officers a sizeable effort, and useful information is abundant. It should be considered, however, that an officer ignoring the language of the country, forced to use an interpreter who often poorly understands what is at stake, can only provide a work lacking in precision. One must already know the habits of the natives to be able to ask specific questions, while some officers have only been in the area for a short time.  The consequences of this quandary, he judged, and in particular the systematic use of interpreters, were extensive: Data relating to psychological life is often wrong. [Ethnic Vietnamese] interpreters habitually cannot admit that the natives may think differently, and consider certain of their customs as immoral and simply do not translate the information relating to these.  Bonifacy also bluntly assessed the intellectual state of his colleagues with regard to the discipline of ethnology:
In addition, the officers conversant in ethnography and ethnology and owning books on these matters are very rare. As a consequence, the details given are sometimes worthless, while the facts pertaining to customs that have great importance for an ethnographic perspective are ignored.  Having himself learned enough about ethnology to understand the value of some of its most classic yet elusive features, Bonifacy was able to point at the shortcomings of the reports:
In most reports, the question of religion, of myths, is only touched upon. . . . Regarding family life, authors often differ from one another. Let's not forget that every race is divided into tribes, each tribe itself is sometimes divided into sub-tribes. . . . It will be necessary later to distinguish between these various groups that have different customs and dialects. In addition, some remains of primitive customs-group marriage, levirate, endogamy, exogamy, etc.-have not been researched, the officers not knowledgeable in ethnology generally ignoring these customs. Same with what belongs to the social life; the types of property, the formation of clans, rules relating to justice: ordeals, judicial evidence, have generally not been treated, sociology still being a little-known science.  Such thoughtful remarks are in tune with today's understandings of fieldwork complications in colonial settings at the turn of the twentieth century.  Aptly, in the  version of Ethnographie, Lunet de Lajonquière explicitly acknowledged the substance of Bonifacy's comments, adding that these critiques could be applied to the work completed in the whole of the four territories.  However, from a pragmatic point of view, he also suggested
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that in the absence of other reliable sources on the ethnography of the border region's population, this material remained of great value.
Outcomes and Aftermath
Higher authorities' expectation that there would be follow-up studies or updates to these two initial surveys seem not to have been met. Though Lunet de Lajonquière stated that the statistical information from the sector reports, upon which colonial taxation came to be based, was updated yearly, there remains no trace of further survey activity.  As I have mentioned, no summary, digest, outline or otherwise has ever been published from the - survey. The unique value of those field reports is thus patent. As for the work of -, there exist only Lunet de Lajonquière's two books, the two hundred and seventy-page Ethnographie des territoires militaires, written in  for the general staff with sketches, tables, and a summary color-coded map covering only the military territories ( Figure ) , and the three hundred and ninety-page public version written two years later, Ethnographie du Tonkin septentrional [Ethnography of Northern Tonkin], with a comparative lexicon in standard Romanized script, tables, an index, a color-coded ethnic map of the whole of Tonkin at :,, ( Figure ) , plus sixty-one original photographs. Both books adopt the structure we are now familiar with: generalities at the beginning followed by a catalogue of "races" and their descriptions under parallel headings whenever enough material was available to fill these in. From such a large on-ground effort to describe as-yet-unknown populations, one is bound to question this relative paucity of tangible outputs. What from the original reports was left out of the two books is in a way more attractive than what was cropped. The discarded data goes far beyond the needs for a mere synopsis and covers a variety of valuable data ranging from meticulous original ethnological maps and drawings, sector-level demographics, comparative lexicons with diacritics and ideograms, and descriptions of rituals and ceremonies, to precise market price lists, accurate topographical description with the layout of rivers, roads, tracks with travel time, and original photographs. In other words, Lunet de Lajonquière, who did not himself participate in the production of the field reports, was never posted in the highlands, had not published on these societies, and who was requested by the high command to bring into being a self-contained précis, took several steps back from field level, retaining what his analytical mind found valuable, ultimately focusing on shared characteristics and downplaying dissimilarity or distinctiveness. As Marcel Mauss rightly remarked in a review of the  opus: "This book has all the virtues, all the faults also of such work imposed by a hierarchy concerned with something other than science."  Reading the original field reports usefully restores the details and nuances.
In addition to Lunet de Lajonquière's volumes, a handful of curious or perhaps simply enlightened military officers independently endeavored to circulate their own publications, helping to supplement the overall portrait. The best of these additional volumes and articles are worth mentioning as they show evidence of their author's exposure to earlier and contemporary relevant literature on the topic both in European languages and in Vietnamese. Unsurprisingly the first publication, or more precisely, stream of publications, belongs to the prolific Auguste Bonifacy. During his military work and well into his retirement in Hà Nội, he published unremittingly from the ultimate historical, anthropological, and linguistic significance of these two very imperfect yet precious surveys of  and  lie in the raw, frontline texts of the sector reports, penned in the field in a consistent way by direct eyewitnesses, supported by unaltered and abundant demographic tables, glossaries, maps, and photographs. It is this material's wellintegrated horizontality that marks its worth.  These fine-grained archives from upland Tonkin represent, for scholars but also for the heirs of the subjects themselves, an unexpected milestone. These texts can become the foundation for a more reliable reading of social and cultural behavior through time and possibly for reiterating social complexity and cultural uniqueness from a past that, arguably, still plays a significant role in today's identity negotiations and political struggles.
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In spite of the strategic orientation and top-down nature of its production, the very short timelines, and, for most authors, a near-total lack of prior knowledge of the populations they were about to bear witness to, I believe we can still confer legitimacy to this frontline ethnographic material. We can argue for or against the view that the officers who contributed to these surveys can be branded "ethnographers." But in my mind, the texts they produced are without a doubt of an ethnographic nature, albeit incidental ethnography. It is the rigorous enforcement of military discipline and norms that places these texts in a different category from contemporary missionary accounts and oft-embellished diaries by travelers and explorers. territoires militaires,'" BEFEO  (): - for a review of this volume, about which another Google Scholar search yields eighteen hits, half of them written in the colonial era, with six of the remaining ones stemming from my work. . I do not set out here to provide a substantial analysis of what these documents contain, my point being first to investigate the structure, details, and context of the production of these reports. I intend to explore in more details the analytical potential of these archives in subsequent publications in an attempt to shed new light on a variety of economic and cultural phenomena unfolding in these highlands today. [cercles] in the four military zones was nine, while sectors totaled forty-seven. As mentioned earlier, the number, names. and size of sectors varied greatly over time due to alterations, reinterpretation of topography, security issues, population movements, infrastructure development, and availability of personnel. With these constraints, subsidiary posts were sometimes promoted to the rank of sector head towns; other sectors were at times merged with neighboring ones and head towns demoted to the rank of posts, or simply gradually dispatched to the civilian administration and incorporated into adjacent provinces-for instance, the circles of Tuyen Quang [Tuyên Quang] and Bac Kan [Bắc Kạn] passed to civilian administration between  and . In addition, due to uneven knowledge of the Vietnamese language and variations in handwriting style, the misspelling of place names occurs frequently among the officers who authored reports, adding another layer to the confusion. . For more than half the sector reports located in the course of this research, either no maps were produced or the maps were separated from the reports. . The summary reports from civilian provinces I could examine seem to have also followed this structure, though generally with more lax and significantly less dedication in digging up the information. No reports seem to have been produced at a more local level within civilian provinces. In this roundabout way, we could say that some of the - field material has effectively reached the public eye through their inclusion in the - reports and, in turn, the publication of Lunet de Lajonquière, Ethnographie des territoires militaires. . Figures  and  proposed by the governor or the EFEO but instead appears to find its inspiration in the  survey might help explain this swiftness.
